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The Impact of the Charter on
the Law of Sexual Assault:
Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est
La Même Chose
Martha Shaffer
I. INTRODUCTION
The law of sexual assault has undergone enormous change in the 30
years since the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 came into
effect. In 1982, the Canadian Criminal Code still contained the offence
of rape, an offence that was defined narrowly. It included only one sexual
act — vaginal intercourse without consent.2 It was defined in such a way
that married men could not be convicted of — or even charged with —
raping their wives. A man accused of rape could be acquitted on the basis
that he mistakenly believed that the complainant had consented to sexual
activity, even where his belief was unreasonable. In addition to rape, the
Criminal Code also contained other sexual offences, including indecent
act against a male, indecent act against a female person and sexual
intercourse with the feeble-minded.3 Finally, even sexual acts between

Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. Thanks to Joanna Birenbaum, Denise Reaume and Benjamin Berger for very helpful thoughts and comments.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
In 1982, the Criminal Code contained the following definition of rape in s. 143:
A male person commits rape when he has sexual intercourse with a female person
who is not his wife,
(a) without her consent, or
(b) with her consent if the consent
(i) is extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm
(ii) is obtained by personating her husband, or
(iii) is obtained by false and fraudulent representations as to the nature and quality of the act.
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 [repealed 1980-81-82, c. 125, s. 6].
3
There were also other more specific provisions, including sexual intercourse with a stepdaughter or female employee, sexual intercourse with the feeble-minded and various seduction
offences. For an excellent description of the law of sexual offences at the time the Charter became
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consenting adults could be prosecuted as “sexual offences” if they were
seen as constituting acts of gross indecency, a provision that was frequently used to criminalize consensual sexual acts between gay men.
Fast forward to 2012. The offences of rape and indecent assault have
been replaced by the offence sexual assault, and by special offences
dealing with sexual assault of children.4 Sexual assault encompasses far
more than unconsensual vaginal intercourse and includes any sexual
touching to which the complainant has not consented.5 The Criminal
Code now contains a definition of sexual consent and a non-exhaustive
list of situations in which consent cannot be legally obtained. The scope
of the defence of mistaken belief in consent has been narrowed to
situations where the accused has taken reasonable steps in the circumstances known to the accused at the time to ascertain that the complainant was consenting. The offence of gross indecency no longer exists.6
In this paper, I examine the extent to which the Charter is responsible
for this dramatic transformation. I will argue that the Charter has been
instrumental in modernizing the law of sexual assault, in part through
legal challenges brought by men accused of sexual offences and in part
through its use by equality-seeking groups as a tool in law reform efforts
that took place during the 1990s. These two mechanisms have brought
about changes to the “law on the books”, the Criminal Code provisions
dealing with sexual assault, which have created a framework for prosecuting sexual offences that has the potential to vindicate women’s rights
to sexual autonomy, dignity, equality and privacy.
I will also argue, however, that the potential of this Charterinfluenced sexual assault legislation is not being realized. My argument
here is that the promise of the law is being thwarted through the operation of deeply engrained assumptions and belief structures about women
and about sexual assault. These belief structures inform the reasoning in
sexual assault trials at a fundamental level. They inform the application
of the sexual assault provisions themselves, but they also inform the
law, see Christine Boyle, Sexual Assault (Toronto: Carswell, 1984). Many of the provisions that
were in place in 1982 were changed the following year as a result of amendments contained in An
Act to amend the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences and other offences against the person
and to amend certain other Acts in relation thereto or in consequence thereof, S.C. 1980-81-82-83,
c. 125.
4
See, for example, ss. 151-153 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
5
R. v. Chase, [1987] S.C.J. No. 57, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 293 (S.C.C.).
6
This offence was repealed in 1987: An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Canada
Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985 (3rd Supp.), c. 19. (Originally An Act to amend the Criminal Code and
the Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 1987, c. 24.)
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determination of evidentiary issues, rulings that are made even before the
court gets to the application of the sexual assault provisions. These
evidentiary rulings have a profound impact on the success of sexual
assault prosecutions, since they control the material the trier of fact is
entitled to consider in determining whether a sexual assault occurred.
Using examples of evidentiary rulings made in two Supreme Court of
Canada sexual assault cases, I will attempt to show how these deeply
embedded assumptions erode the promise of the Charter-influenced law
reforms by injecting problematic views into the reasoning process.
I conclude by offering some observations on the highly publicized
Dominique Strauss-Kahn case from the United States. I argue that the
public responses to the complainant’s allegations have much to teach us
about attitudes about sexual assault that operate in a less visible way in
the courtroom. Acknowledging the existence of these attitudes — and
their prevalence — is essential in assessing the role of the Charter in
transforming the law of sexual assault. My argument here is that even
though the Charter has not succeeded in eradicating myths and stereotypes that undermine sexual assault prosecutions, it is unrealistic to
expect the Charter to do so. Changing the law on the books is often
difficult, but it is almost always easier to bring about legislative change
than it is to change deeply held attitudes and beliefs.

II. THE CHARTER’S ROLE IN RESHAPING THE
LAW OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
The modernization of sexual assault law began with a package of
Criminal Code amendments that took effect in 1983, less than a year
after the Charter became law.7 Although the Charter may not have
figured prominently in this initial stage of the law’s transformation, it has
played an important role in subsequent developments. The impact of the
Charter is most apparent in two law reform initiatives during the 1990s
that resulted in important changes to the Criminal Code.8 The first of
these initiatives, Bill C-49,9 brought in section 273.1 and the current
version of section 276 of the Criminal Code. An important milestone in
7
These amendments were contained in An Act to amend the Criminal Code in relation to
sexual offences and other offences against the person and to amend certain other Acts in relation
thereto or in consequence thereof, supra, note 3. Among other changes, these amendments were
responsible for creating the offence of sexual assault and for removing the marital rape exemption.
8
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
9
An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), S.C. 1992, c. 38.

340

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d)

the law’s transformation, section 273.1 changed the law in three significant ways: (1) it introduced a definition of sexual consent into the
Criminal Code; (2) it set out a non-exhaustive list of situations in which
as a matter of law no consent to sexual touching is obtained; and (3) it
limited the defence of mistaken belief in consent, a defence that had been
strongly criticized by feminists. Section 276 brought in new rape shield
provisions and a new procedure for determining whether an accused
person could introduce evidence of a complainant’s sexual history as part
of his defence.
The second reform initiative, Bill C-46,10 brought in section 278 of
the Criminal Code. Section 278 set limits on the defence practice of
routinely seeking disclosure of the complainant’s personal records,
including therapeutic records, medical records, child protection records,
and educational records. This practice, which became widespread in the
early 1990s, was denounced by women’s groups as violating the privacy
of sexual assault complainants and as a tactic designed to discredit
complainants and to discourage them from coming forward with allegations of sexual assault.11 Section 278 restricted this practice and set out a
process for determining when a complainant’s personal records would
have to be produced to the court and disclosed to the defence.
Both of these reform initiatives share two salient features in terms of
the role the Charter played in their development. First, both of these
reforms came about as responses to successful Charter based legal claims
mounted by men accused of sexual offences. Second, in the law reform
process that followed, women’s organizations were able to use the
Charter as a tool for arguing for better protection of women’s Charter
rights. Although women’s organizations did not obtain all of the changes
they sought in the ensuing sexual assault reforms, they succeeded in
obtaining provisions that afford complainants greater legal protection
than the provisions they replaced. Ironically, legal victories by men
accused of sexual assault were the catalyst for reforms that — at least on
the books — have the potential to strengthen complainants’ rights to
autonomy, dignity, equality and privacy.

10

An Act to amend the Criminal Code (production of records in sexual offence proceedings), S.C. 1997, c. 30.
11
One of the earliest cases in which the accused sought to cross-examine a complainant on
her medical records is R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.). The sexual
assault alleged in that case took place in 1987.
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The impetus behind Bill C-49 was the Supreme Court of Canada’s
1991 decision in R. v. Seaboyer.12 Seaboyer was a constitutional challenge to the “rape shield” provisions of the Criminal Code, sections 276
and 277. Section 277, the more straightforward of the two provisions,
prohibited the admission of any evidence of the complainant’s sexual
reputation for the purpose of challenging or supporting her credibility.13
This provision had been introduced to stop accused men from relying on
what had been a well established inference at common law, that a woman
with a sexual past was less worthy of belief.14 Section 276 prohibited the
accused from introducing evidence of the complainant’s sexual activity
with other people, unless that evidence fell within three specific exceptions.15 This provision attempted to prevent the accused from relying on
another long-standing inference, that a woman who had consented to
have sex with men in the past would be more likely to have consented to
sex with the accused. The defence argued that these rape shield provisions violated an accused person’s right to a fair trial and right to make
full answer and defence, guaranteed by sections 7 and 11(d) of the
Charter. Although the Supreme Court unanimously upheld section 277, a
7-2 majority16 struck down section 276 on the ground that it prevented

12
R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Seaboyer”].
13
Although this provision speaks of sexual history evidence used to support a complainant’s credibility, s. 277 was designed to prohibit defence counsel from relying upon an inference
that had been deeply entrenched in the common law, that an unchaste woman was less worthy of
belief.
14
This inference is similar to the credibility inference we continue to permit with respect to
witnesses with criminal records — triers of fact are entitled to conclude that a person who has been
convicted of an offence is less worthy of belief. See R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1
S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.).
15
Section 276 provided:
276(1) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 271, 272 or 273, no
evidence shall be adduced by or on behalf of the accused concerning the sexual activity of the complainant with any person other than the accused unless
(a) it is evidence that rebuts evidence of the complainant’s sexual activity or absence
thereof that was previously adduced by the prosecution;
(b) it is evidence of specific instances of the complainant’s sexual activity tending to
establish the identity of the person who had sexual contact with the complainant
on the occasion set out in the charge; or
(c) it is evidence of sexual activity that took place on the same occasion as the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, where that evidence relates to the consent that the accused alleges he believed was given by the
complainant.
16
Justices L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier dissented.
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the defence from leading relevant evidence that could be “essential to the
presentation of legitimate defences and to a fair trial”.17
Bill C-46, which led to the provisions dealing with personal records,
was precipitated by the proliferation of cases in which men accused of
sexual assault sought disclosure of the complainant’s personal records.
This practice drew legal support from the Crown’s obligation to disclose
all relevant information to the defence, an obligation that was given
constitutional status by the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Stinchcombe.18 In Stinchcombe, the Court held that the principles of fundamental justice guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter include the right to
make full answer and defence and that this right mandates full disclosure
by the Crown. In sexual assault cases, defence counsel invoked this
holding to argue for disclosure of the complainant’s personal records on
the basis that the records might contain something relevant to the sexual
assault allegations.
The practice of seeking production and disclosure of the complainant’s personal records was given explicit constitutional imprimatur in
R. v. O’Connor,19 a 1995 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada.
O’Connor was a Catholic Bishop accused of sexually assaulting four
Aboriginal girls at a residential school.20 Before trial, he sought disclosure of the complainants’ entire medical, counselling and school records,
claiming that he needed these records to make full answer and defence.
In a complex ruling, a 5-4 majority of the Court held that section 7 of the
Charter guarantees the accused access to information necessary to make
full answer and defence and this could include the complainant’s personal records.21 The majority held that where these records were held by
the Crown they should be disclosed as a matter of course according to
the Stinchcombe holding. Where the records were in the hands of third
17

Seaboyer, supra, note 12, at para. 75. The majority also held that any statutory provision
that excludes evidence the probative value of which is not substantially outweighed by its potential
prejudice will infringe s. 7 of the Charter.
18
[1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stinchcombe”].
19
[1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.).
20
The initial drafting of Bill C-46 occurred before the release of the Supreme Court’s decision. For a helpful discussion of the history of the Bill, see Women’s Legal Education and Action
Fund, “Submissions to Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Review of Bill C-46,
March 1997” [available from LEAF and on file with the author].
21
The majority drew a distinction between records in the possession of the Crown and
records in the hands of third parties. Disclosure of records in the possession or control of the Crown
was to be governed by the Court’s decision in Stinchcombe, supra, note 18, which held that the
Crown must disclose all information in its possession to the defence, unless it is clearly irrelevant or
privileged. For records held by third parties, courts were to balance the accused’s right to make full
answer and defence with the complainant’s constitutional right to privacy. Id., at para. 17.
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parties, such as the clinicians or counsellors who made them, the
accused’s right to full answer and defence would have to be balanced
with the complainant’s privacy rights.
These legal victories by men accused of sexual assault prompted Parliament to respond by introducing Bill C-49 and Bill C-46. During the
consultation process leading up to these Bills, women’s organizations
used the Charter to argue for — and to secure — reforms to the sexual
assault provisions that took women’s rights seriously.22 The Charter
played an enormous role in this process and its influence is clear from
both the Preambles to the Bills and from the content of the amendments
themselves. The Preambles to both Bills explicitly state that it is Parliament’s intention to craft sexual assault provisions that respect the Charter
rights of complainants as well as the Charter rights of persons accused of
sexual offences.23 The inclusion of complainants’ Charter rights in the
drafting process had a profound impact on the provisions contained in
both Bills C-49 and C-46. These amendments enhance the protection of
women’s Charter rights by explicitly attempting to root out discriminatory beliefs that have bedevilled sexual assault prosecutions and by
defining consent in a way that takes women’s sexual autonomy seriously.
As a result of this Charter infused law reform process, the sexual
assault provisions in the Criminal Code today create a framework that
appears to vindicate women’s rights to equality, autonomy, dignity and
privacy. This statutory framework is augmented by the 1999 decision of
22
The briefs submitted by the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund in the consultation process for both Bills are excellent examples of using the Charter as a law reform tool. See
Submissions to Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Review of Bill C-46, supra, note
20, and Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund, “Submissions to the Legislative Committee of
Parliament on Bill C-49, An Act Respecting Sexual Assault”, available from LEAF and on file with
the author.
23
The Preamble to Bill C-49 states that Parliament is gravely concerned about the prevalence of sexual assault against women and children, intends to promote the full protection of the
rights guaranteed under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter, and wishes to provide for the prosecution of
offences within a framework of laws that are consistent with the principles of fundamental justice
and that are fair to complainants as well as to accused persons. The Preamble to Bill C-46 is even
more explicit about the goal of safeguarding women’s Charter rights. It states that Parliament
recognizes that violence has a particularly disadvantageous impact on the equal participation of
women and children in society and on the rights of women and children to security of the person,
privacy and equal benefit of the law as guaranteed by ss. 7, 8, 15 and 28 of the Charter. It also states
that Parliament intends to ensure the full protection of the Charter rights of those accused of sexual
violence and of the victims of sexual violence, and to provide for the prosecution of offences within
a framework consistent with the principles of fundamental justice that are fair to complainant as well
as to accused persons. Finally, the Preamble states that Charter rights are guaranteed equally to all
and, where Charter rights conflict, they are to be accommodated and reconciled to the greatest extent
possible.
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the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Ewanchuk,24 which interpreted key
aspects of section 273.1 and section 273.2. Now, as a result of section
273.1, we have a definition of sexual consent that focuses on whether
there was “voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the
sexual activity in question”. According to Ewanchuk, it is the complainant’s state of mind at the time of the activity that determines the existence of consent.25 Now, as a result of section 273.2, it is more difficult to
secure an acquittal on the basis of a mistaken belief in consent. An
accused person cannot rely on the defence if he “did not take reasonable
steps in the circumstances known to [him] at the time, to ascertain that
the complainant was consenting”. In addition, in Ewanchuk the Supreme
Court held that an accused person cannot rely on a mistaken belief in
consent unless he can point to something in the evidence that is capable
of supporting his belief that the complainant had communicated her
consent to the sexual activity in question.26 Both sections 273.1 and
273.2 — as interpreted in Ewanchuk — enhance women’s autonomy by
ensuring that consent is defined from the complainant’s perspective, that
a woman’s consent cannot be assumed or implied, and that before an
accused person engages in sexual conduct, there must be some indication
through words or conduct, that the complainant communicated her
consent to the activity. This approach to consent is further underscored
by section 273.1(2), which sets out a non-exhaustive list of five situations in which an accused cannot claim to have obtained consent.27 These
situations ensure that the accused cannot rely on outdated beliefs such as
“no means yes” but must instead focus on the complainant’s expressions
of consent and take any indications of lack of consent seriously.
The rape shield provisions in section 276 and the personal records
provisions in section 278 also attempt to eradicate the operation of
24
25
26
27

[1999] S.C.J. No. 10, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ewanchuk”].
Id., at para. 26.
Id., at paras. 46-49.
Section 273.1(2) provides:
No consent is obtained, for the purposes of sections 271, 272 and 273, where
(a) the agreement is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the
complainant;
(b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity;
(c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority;
(d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage
in the activity; or
(e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by
words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity.
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discriminatory beliefs from sexual assault prosecutions. The rape shield
provisions are drafted to prevent the use of sexual history evidence for
discriminatory or improper purposes and to respect the complainant’s
privacy and dignity. They specifically prohibit the admission of sexual
history evidence to support the two discriminatory inferences that were
deeply rooted at common law, that a woman who had consented to
sexual activity in the past was more likely to have consented on this
occasion and that a woman with a sexual past was less worthy of belief.28
In determining whether the evidence is admissible for other inferences,
the court must consider “the need to remove from the fact-finding
process any discriminatory belief or bias”, the “potential prejudice to the
complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy” and the “right of the
complainant ... to personal security and to the full protection and benefit
of the law”.29 To further protect the complainant’s privacy and dignity,
the hearing to determine whether sexual history evidence should be
admitted is held in camera30 and the complainant is not a compellable
witness.31
Similarly, the provisions governing production and disclosure of personal records attempt to safeguard the equality and privacy rights of
complainants by limiting fishing expeditions by the defence and by
ensuring that production of records is not based on discriminatory beliefs
and bias. Section 278 identifies several assertions as being insufficient to
found a claim that the complainant’s records are likely relevant to an
issue at trial. These include assertions that are so generic that they
amount to nothing more than fishing expeditions (the record relates to
the incident in question32 or the record might contain a prior inconsistent
statement33). They also include assertions rooted in various stereotypes
(the record may relate to the reliability of the complainant because she
has received psychiatric treatment, therapy or counselling,34 the record
relates to sexual activity of the complainant with any person,35 and the
record relates to the presence or absence of recent complaint36). Like
section 276, section 278 provides that the hearing to determine whether
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Section 276.1(a) and (b).
Section 276(3)(d), (f) and (g).
Section 276.2(1).
Section 276.2(2).
Section 278.3(4)(c).
Section 278.3(4)(d).
Section 278.3(4)(f).
Section 278.3(4)(h).
Section 278.3(4)(i).
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the records should be produced to the court will be held in camera and
that the complainant is not a compellable witness.37
For those committed to women’s equality, these Charter-influenced
sexual assault provisions have vastly improved the law on the books.
These provisions appear to create a substantive law of sexual assault that
enshrines women’s ability to make meaningful choices about whether,
when and with whom they will engage in sexual activity, and a court
process for the prosecution of sexual offences that ensures the protection
of women’s dignity, privacy and equality rights.

III. THE LAW IN OPERATION: PROMISE THWARTED
Despite their promise, the Charter influenced sexual assault provisions have not succeeded in living up to their potential to protect
women’s Charter rights. Like all laws, the sexual assault provisions are
only as good as their implementation. Historically, sexual assault laws
have been implemented against a backdrop of formal legal rules and
informal assumptions that have treated women who allege sexual
victimization with deep suspicion. These rules reflected the view
infamously expressed by Sir Matthew Hale in the 17th century that “rape
... is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to
be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.” The law
instantiated this suspicion in many various ways. Women who had been
sexually violated were expected to raise a “hue and cry” at the earliest
available opportunity. Failure to make a “recent complaint” would
invariably be fatal to the prosecution.38 A complainant’s testimony had to
be corroborated as it was seen as unsafe to convict based solely on her
allegations.39 As discussed earlier, women’s sexual reputation and sexual
history were seen as critical factors in sexual offence prosecutions, as
they were seen to affect her credibility and her willingness to consent.
Other less formal assumptions about women and sexuality have also
pervaded — and continue to pervade — the prosecution of sexual
offences. Although these assumptions do not take the form of legal rules,
they affect the findings of fact that are made at trial and the application
37
Section 278.4(1) and (2). Section 278.4(2) also grants standing to any person who has
“possession or control” of the record and “any other person to whom the record relates” to appear
and make submissions at the hearing.
38
See, for example, R. v. Kribs, [1960] S.C.J. No. 16, [1960] S.C.R. 400 (S.C.C.).
39
For a discussion of the corroboration rules immediately before the reforms, see: Christine
Boyle, Sexual Assault, supra, note 3.
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of the formal legal rules. These assumptions include: that women who
dress “provocatively” or who behave a certain way (flirtatiously) are
“asking” for it, that consenting to go to a man’s home is consenting to
sexual contact, that women say no (at least initially) when they really
mean yes, that women often put up some “token” resistance, or that
silence or lack of resistance amount to consent.
Whether formal or informal, these assumptions inject stereotypes
into the law that prevent the law from protecting women’s interests.
Herein lies the reason that the promise of the Charter-inspired sexual
assault provisions remains unfulfilled. While these provisions have
removed stereotype and bias from the formal rules governing sexual
offences, they have not eradicated bias and stereotype from the informal
assumptions at play in the application of the formal rules. Moreover,
even though formal rules may be changed so that they no longer explicitly embody stereotyped assumptions, the underlying stereotypes do not
automatically disappear with the formal changes. Instead, the same
stereotypes may resurface in a different location, sometimes in a modified form.
Stereotypes and bias can enter into the application of the new sexual
assault provisions in several places. They can creep into the determination of whether the complainant consented, a determination that is based
in part on whether we believe that the complainant responded in the way
that a “real victim” of sexual assault responds. If the complainant did not
behave in this way, she is likely to be seen as not credible and her
testimony about consent is not likely to be believed.40 Problematic beliefs
and assumptions can also enter into the defence of mistaken belief in
consent when we determine, for example, whether there is evidence that
is capable of showing that the complainant communicated consent to the
sexual activity in question. This question requires us to interpret the
complainant’s behaviour and to assess what it was that she was communicating. How we read a woman’s behaviour will depend on deeply
entrenched attitudes about how women are supposed to conduct them-

40
As Emma Cunliffe discusses in greater detail in her paper in this volume, the case of R. v.
H. (J.M.), [2011] S.C.J. No. 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197 (S.C.C.) provides a good example of this
problem. The trial judge acquitted the accused of sexual assault in part because the teenage
complainant behaved in ways that in the trial judge’s view were not consistent with the behaviour of
a person who had been sexually assaulted. Although the trial judge rejected the accused’s testimony
that no sexual activity occurred, the actions of the complainant contributed to raising a reasonable
doubt on the issue of consent. See Emma Cunliffe, “Sexual Assault Cases in the Supreme Court of
Canada: Losing Sight of Substantive Equality?”
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selves in social/sexual situations and what specific actions mean in these
contexts.
But problematic beliefs and assumptions can also enter into the sexual assault trial in less obvious ways through the application of other
legal rules. One of the places where this occurs is in the rules of evidence. Evidence law has a profound effect on the trial process because
evidentiary rulings determine what material the trier of fact is entitled to
see and what material will be withheld from the fact-finders’ consideration. Many of these evidentiary rulings turn on deeply held, and often
unstated, assumptions about how the world works, how people behave,
and about what people know. For example, the test for relevance — the
first prerequisite for determining whether a piece of evidence is admissible or not — is whether, based on logic and human experience, the
evidence makes a fact in issue more or less likely to be true. Both of
these concepts, human experience and logic, depend very much on the
individual fact-finder’s experience, world-view, and background assumptions about human behaviour. And, although these background assumptions are often thought of as “common sense” — that is, as underlying
truths about the world that everyone knows and that all reasonable
people share — they are often deeply contested.41
The pivotal role played by background assumptions and common
sense makes evidence law an area rife for the introduction of bias and
stereotype. The determination, for example, of whether a piece of
evidence is relevant, whether evidence can be admitted under the similar
fact evidence rule, and whether expert evidence on human behaviour is
admissible, often turn on our common sense beliefs about human
behaviour, about whether facts are related to one another, or about the
inferences that can legitimately be drawn from proven facts. Where
common sense is tainted by myth and stereotype, or where common
sense is the product of limited human experience, evidentiary rulings can
reflect this bias. In an area like sexual assault, where stereotyped assumptions continue to abound, the concern that common sense notions
might distort the reasoning process is particularly acute.
To illustrate the critical role that common sense plays in evidentiary
determinations in sexual assault cases, I will discuss two recent Supreme
Court of Canada cases, R. v. D. (D.)42 and R. v. Handy.43 While both of
41
Albert Einstein made this point well when he famously described common sense as “the
collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen”.
42
[2000] S.C.J. No. 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “D.D.”].
43
[2002] S.C.J. No. 57, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Handy”].
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these cases involved sexual assaults, the arguments at the Supreme Court
of Canada focused on two very different evidence issues, expert evidence
and similar fact evidence. In both of the cases, the question of admissibility turned in large part on common sense assumptions and in both cases
the common sense assumptions employed by the trial judges differed
sharply from the common sense assumptions invoked by the Supreme
Court of Canada. In both of the cases, the common sense assumptions
invoked by the Supreme Court of Canada worked to the detriment of the
sexual assault prosecutions.
In D.D., the Court’s background assumptions operated to prevent the
admission of expert evidence on the meaning of delayed disclosure of
childhood sexual abuse. D.D. involved a man charged with sexually
assaulting his stepdaughter on numerous occasions when she was five
and six years old. The child did not disclose the abuse until two-and-ahalf years later when, in the course of a conversation about “gross
things” she told a school friend. The fact that the child had delayed
disclosing the abuse was a prominent plank in the defence’s argument.
Defence counsel cross-examined the complainant about why she had
waited so long to tell anyone about the abuse, and suggested that she had
made up her allegations to be able to outdo her friend in telling gross
stories.44 He also indicated that he intended to argue that “the fact that the
victim did not tell anybody is certainly evidence that it didn’t happen to
her.”45 In response, the Crown sought to admit expert evidence on
disclosure patterns of children who have been abused. The essence of the
expert’s testimony was that the timing of disclosure is affected by many
factors and that the length of time before a child discloses an incident is
neither proof that it happened nor proof that it did not.46
The trial judge ruled this evidence admissible. Applying the test for
the admissibility of expert evidence, he held that the evidence was
relevant because the defence was taking the position that the jury could
draw a “common sense” inference from the delay that the complainant
was fabricating her allegations.47 He also held that the evidence was
necessary because the information was outside the knowledge and
expertise of the jury and that its admission was necessary for the jury to
reach a just verdict.
44
45
46
47

Supra, note 42, at para. 4.
Id., at para. 7.
Id., at paras. 5-6.
Id., at paras. 17-18.
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In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada disagreed.48 Justice
Major, for the majority, held that the expert evidence was not necessary.
In the majority’s view, the expert’s evidence boiled down to a simple
proposition, that the “timing of the disclosure, standing alone, signifies
nothing.”49 All jurors would be capable of understanding this. Although
the majority recognized the possibility that some jurors might engage in
stereotypical reasoning and assume that a true victim complains at the
earliest opportunity, it held that a jury instruction from the trial judge
would prevent jurors from engaging in reasoning of this sort. Accordingly, there was “no possibility that the jury would reach an erroneous
conclusion if not assisted by the expert”.50
The majority at the Supreme Court of Canada had a very different
view of common sense than the trial judge. The trial judge was clearly
worried that the jury’s “common sense” about delayed disclosure would
distort their reasoning process. The majority of the Supreme Court was
not. The majority’s confidence that the jury would not rely on a stereotyped understanding of delayed disclosure is both puzzling and problematic. It is puzzling in light of the majority’s explicit recognition that the
belief that a real victim of sexual violence will make an immediate “hue
and cry” has been so deeply entrenched within Anglo-Canadian law that
it can be traced back to the 13th century. It is problematic in light of the
fact that defence counsel was explicitly urging the jury to rely on this
“common sense” proposition. For the trial judge — and the dissenting
judges at the Supreme Court of Canada — the congruence of the defence
argument with long-standing and deeply held prejudices signalled the
need to dispel, through expert evidence, the common sense beliefs jurors
might bring to bear on the issue of delayed disclosure. In contrast, the
majority at the Supreme Court operated on a different background
assumption, that stereotypes that have operated since the 13th century no
longer pose a serious concern in sexual assault cases. As a result of this
background assumption, evidence aimed at countering stereotypes about
sexual assault complainants, stereotypes that defence counsel was
explicitly invoking, was ruled inadmissible.
Common sense assumptions played a different role in Handy, the
leading Supreme Court of Canada decision on similar fact evidence. In
Handy, the complainant alleged that she had consented to a sexual
48
The majority consisted of Iacobucci, Major, Binnie and Arbour JJ. Chief Justice McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ. were in dissent.
49
Supra, note 42, at para. 59.
50
Id., at para. 70.
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encounter with the accused, but during the encounter she told him to stop
when he began to hurt her. He refused to stop, and then abruptly
switched from vaginal to anal intercourse. The complainant again told
him to stop and again he refused. In an attempt to stop the activity, the
complainant slapped Handy’s face. He responded by hitting her on the
chest, squeezing her stomach, punching and choking her. Handy was
charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm.
At trial, the Crown sought to introduce as similar fact evidence several incidents in which Handy was alleged to have sexually assaulted his
ex-wife during the course of their very turbulent, seven-year relationship.
The trial judge admitted this evidence, holding that the way that Handy
had acted on previous occasions with his ex-wife could assist the jury in
determining how he had acted with the complainant.51 The Supreme
Court of Canada held that the evidence should not have been admitted.
The Court gave several reasons for this conclusion, but the reason
relevant here is the Court’s rejection of the trial judge’s view that
Handy’s treatment of his ex-wife was probative of the way he might have
treated the complainant.
Justice Binnie, for a unanimous nine-member Court, held that there
was an important difference between the act alleged by the complainant
and the assaults against the ex-wife, and that was that the act in question
took place in the context of a one-night stand whereas the assaults
against the ex-wife took place in the course of what Binnie J. called a
“long-term dysfunctional marriage”. For Binnie J. and the other eight
judges, it was not at all clear that the way that Handy treated his wife was
predictive of how he would treat another woman in the context of a night
of casual sex. Justice Binnie reasoned here that there were numerous
periods of consensual sex during Handy’s relationship with his ex-wife
and that the abuse did not begin until after their marriage, at a time when
their relationship “demonstrated many complexities that have no parallel
with the situation in which the complainant found herself”.52 These
differences led Binnie J. to question not only whether Handy’s treatment
of his ex-wife could be extrapolated to his treatment of other women, but
also the epistemological basis on which it would be possible to draw that
conclusion. Justice Binnie put these questions in the following way:
51
Supra, note 43, at para. 17. According to the trial judge, the similar fact evidence showed
“a pattern of using an initially consensual situation to escalate into violent, painful sexual connection, with both vaginal and anal penetration”.
52
Id., at para. 130.
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To what extent was [Handy’s] behaviour with his ex-wife an incident
of a particular conjugal relationship and to what extent did it reflect a
propensity to deal in a certain way with casual sex partners, including
the complainant? To what extent can “common sense” be safely relied
upon to answer this question? With what confidence can the necessary
inferences be drawn? There is no satisfactory answer to these basic
questions in this record.53

Again, the judges of the Supreme Court clearly had a very different view
from the trial judge about what common sense tells us in these types of
situations. For the trial judge, common sense tells us that how a man
treats a woman to whom he is married may be probative of how he treats
other women, including those with whom he has casual sexual encounters. According to the judges of the Supreme Court we cannot rely on
common sense to tell us this. For the judges of the Supreme Court, the
inference that a man who refused to respect his wife’s right to consent to
sexual activity might also refuse to respect the consent of other women is
not one that can be drawn in the absence of other evidence. This inference was not part of the stock of shared understandings of how people
behave or how the world works.
In different ways, these cases illustrate the profound impact that
background, “common sense” assumptions can have in a sexual assault
trial. In D.D. the trial judge held that common sense views based on
stereotypes of how a real victim of childhood sexual abuse would behave
might distort the fact-finding process. The majority of the Supreme Court
of Canada took a different view of common sense, suggesting instead
that reliance on common sense would not lead the jury to engage in
biased reasoning.54 In Handy, the belief that a man who repeatedly failed
to respect his wife’s right to refuse consent to sexual contact might also
fail to respect another woman’s right to refuse consent was part of the
trial judge’s background, common sense assumptions. It was not part of
the background assumptions of the judges at the Supreme Court of
Canada. In both cases, different background or common sense assumptions made the difference between whether evidence that would have
assisted the prosecution of sexual offences was admitted or not.

53

Id.
The majority’s view that juries were unlikely to engage in stereotyped reasoning based on
the timing of disclosure was based primarily on the fact that Parliament had abrogated the rules on
recent complaint. According to the majority, the expert evidence did nothing more than restate the
law, and this could be appropriately done in a jury instruction.
54
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What do the decisions in D.D. and Handy tell us about the Charter’s
impact on the law of sexual assault? They tell us that even though the
Charter has been instrumental in producing a law of sexual assault that
takes women’s Charter rights seriously, obstacles remain. They exist any
time that myth and stereotype can enter into legal reasoning. This
potential exists any time judges and juries have resort to “common
sense”, their stock of deeply held beliefs and assumptions about human
behaviour.

IV. EPILOGUE: THE TALE OF D.S.K. AND THE CHAMBERMAID:
WHAT THE D.S.K. CASE TEACHES US ABOUT THE CHARTER
AND THE LAW OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
When head of the International Monetary Fund and French presidential hopeful Dominique Strauss-Kahn was charged with sexually assaulting a member of the housekeeping staff at an exclusive New York City
hotel in May 2011, the case garnered international attention. Like
countless others, I was riveted by the case. The case was fascinating not
merely because of the people involved — a rich and powerful, white
French man and a poor, illiterate black refugee from West Africa — or
the nature of the allegations, or the prosecution’s ultimate decision to
drop the charges. It was fascinating because of the very strong reactions
the case evoked, in media reports in Canada and internationally, and in
the many conversations I had with colleagues, friends and acquaintances.
Most striking were the many reasons people voiced for disbelieving
or discrediting the complainant. These reasons included:





The complainant was a large woman compared to DSK who is
relatively short in stature, and if she truly was not consenting, she
would have been able to fight him off.
The complainant must have been a prostitute or she must have
agreed to the sexual act with the purpose of extorting money from
DSK.
If she had really been attacked, the complainant would have
screamed and other housekeepers in neighbouring rooms would
have heard.
If she had really been assaulted, the complainant would not have
gone on to clean another hotel room, which is what hotel records
showed that she did.
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It is impossible for a man to force a woman to perform oral sex.
It would not have been possible for DSK to commit this assault in
the nine or so minutes that DSK and the complainant were in the hotel room together.
The complainant’s boyfriend was serving time for criminal offences,
suggesting that she might also be involved in criminal activity.

These “common sense” reactions drowned out a competing set of
common sense reactions that saw the complainant’s account as plausible
— that she had been taken by surprise and that she was afraid to scream
or to fight back because she did not want to lose her job, which was the
highest paying job she had obtained since arriving in the United States.
Why is the case, and the strong reactions to it, so instructive? What
does an event that took place in the United States have to tell us about the
effect of the Charter on the law of sexual assault? Because it was played
out in the court of public opinion, the DSK case provides a window into
thinking processes that undoubtedly also take place in deliberations
occurring behind courtroom doors. In other words, the DSK case
provides a sobering glimpse into the background assumptions and
common sense understandings that people bring with them into the
courtroom in sexual assault cases, not merely in the United States but in
Canada and other countries as well.
The DSK case is also instructive in evaluating the effect of the Charter on the law of sexual assault. It reminds us that changing formal legal
rules is only part of the process of effecting real change and perhaps the
easier part. The other part is changing the underlying beliefs and attitudes
that gave rise to the problematic legal rules in the first place. Changing
belief structures is a much more difficult task and takes a much longer
time, particularly when these belief structures are deeply entrenched.
DSK is a good reminder that we cannot expect the Charter to fix all
the problems with the law of sexual assault. It reminds us that even
though sexual assault law has come a long way under the Charter, the
Charter can only take us so far and there is still a long way to go. Plus ça
change, plus c’est la même chose.

